Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

State of Utah v. Frank Parker : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Frank Parker; Appellant pro se.
E. Neal Gunnarson, Clark A. Harms; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Parker, No. 960059 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/43

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

' m gr-&w

m

*m8? Kg? 'SS?' H IS

UTAH
IT
KFU
Frank Parker/Pro Se C i:II*l
1388 Richard Street
Salt Lake City, UT 8.41JB

.A^O

DOCKET NO

HJLS^Q;

TJ

t»l

Ill THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF
CaseNo. 9 6 0 0 5 9 - c a

Plaintiff/Appelle
vs.

Priority No.

j o

FRANK PARKER
Defendant-Appella ilil
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THIS IS AN APPEALTfiiiM A "FORFEITURE", ORDER AND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 5- >ll(fl|J|(l), .ITHE HONORABLE: SANDA PEULER PRESIDING.

'JLA;
FRANK PARKER
rPRO SE COUNSEL
J,JTAHSTrtTFERISON
•P O BOX 250

E. NEAL GUNARSON
D.A. FOR SALT LAKE 000^1?
CLARK A. HARMS, BAR i/:>
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINT II ('• iPONpENT
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUN I j|
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84LU]|

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COVER

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II

TABLE OF AUTHORTIES

1,2

APPENDIX

3

JURIDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING

4

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLANT REVIEW

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5,6

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
"Did the trial court violate the United State Constitutional Amendment
VIII,"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted?"
6,7,8
POINT II
Did the trial court violate the Appellant fifth amendment Double Jeopardy
Rights?
8,9,10,11
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

11,12,13,14
15,16

TABLE OF AUTHORTIES
CASES
Austin vs. United States. U.S. -113 S. Ct. at 2801, 725 L:Ed,2d448 (1993) id.
at —113 S. Ct. at 2810

7,8

State of Utah vs. 392 South 600 East. 886 p.2d,534 (UT. 1994)
State of Utah vs. Wallace Davis. Case No. 940574-CA

8
11,15

United States vs. S405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th cir.
1994)

4,9,10

United States vs. Halper. 490, U.S. 435,448,109 S.Ct 1892,1902,104 L, ed.2d
487(1989)

4

United States vs. McCaslin. 863 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994)

10

United States vs. Stanwood. 872 F. Supo 791 (D. or 1994)

10

United States vs. Torres. 28 F. 3d 1463,1465 (7th Cir.), Cert, denied- U.S.--,
115S.Ct.,669(1994)

9,10

United States vs. Urserv. 59 F. 3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 1995)

1

10

STATUES

U.S.C.A. Constitutional Amendment. (VIII) 1953, 58-37-13(l)(i)

6

Utah Constitutional Amendment Art. 1 Section, 9

6

Utah Code Ann. General Provision Part 4. 76-1-401

10,11

Utah Code Ann. General Provision Part 4: 76-1-402

7

Utah Code Ann. General Provision Part 4: 76-1-403

13

Utah Code Ann. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8
Utah Code Ann. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 13

2

4
4,6,7,9

APPENDIX
Certificate of Service
Motion to return Seized Evidence
Notice of Appeal
Order of Judgment Sentence and Comitment
Salt Lake County Sheriff Office, Court Service Division, Certificate of Service

[APPENDIX IN ALPHA BETICAL ORDER]
[EOP]

3

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPEAL
:

vs.

:

Frank Parker

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 960059-ca

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF T ¥ E PROCEEDING
Appeal from a forfeiture, pursuant to, Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13(1), The derivative from the
Appellant violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8. Thereafter a bargain to "conditional" guilty plea.
Utah Code Ann.58-37-8 a felony of the third degree.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court violate the United State Constitutional Amendment VIII "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted?"
Citing; United States vs. Halper. 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct (1892)(1989); Utah Constitution
Amend. Article, I Section 9. Secondly, did the trial court violate the Appellant fifth amendment
Double Jeopardy Rights. In concluding that the criminal action and the forfeiture action were
separate proceedings, separate times, separate judges, but litigated the exact same facts. Established;
United States vs. S405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 f.3d 1210,1216 (9th cir. 1994).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 21,1994, appellant/Frank Parker was arrested by the Murray City Police for
4

possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. Resulting from the arrest, the
Appellant property was seized (see Appendix for full description of property). Murray City police
were contacted by an individual "Johnny Emery Blanchard" who stated he had brought some cocaine
from the appellant. He stated that he had given the appellant permission to use his vehicle until he
could get money for the cocaine. John Emery Blanchard then contacted the appellant by pager,
requesting that the appellant meet him at the 7-eleven at 4811 South State to buy more drugs.
Murray police were awaiting the Appellant arrival. When appellant arrived officers approached the
appellant, thereafter Johnny Emery Blanchard departed from the Appellant vehicle. "No transaction
took place between Johnny Emery Blanchard and the appellant." Handcuffs were placed on the
appellant for the officer's safety. The appellant did not consent to the officers request to search the
vehicle. However, the officer could see an open container of beer on the passenger floor board of
the Appellant vehicle. Under the probable cause statute the officer searched the Appellant vehicle,
finding on the passenger floor board of the vehicle one small pouch with individual badges of a
white powdery substance believed to be cocaine. A female who was accompanying the appellant
was inside the 7-eleven, thereafter, being made aware of the situation by a clerk working at the 7eleven. The officers then apprehended the female, and during a pat search the officer found a pipe
and baking soda that were believed to be drug paraphernalia. The female was transported to the
Murray Police Department where she confessed that the drugs were the property of the appellant,
in exchange for her release and further complication with the law. The controlled substance was
booked into evidence at the Murray Police Station and the appellant was booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail.
POINT I
5

"Did the trial court violate the United State Constitutional Amendment
VIII,ff Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted?"
The appellant argues, consciously that the trial court tried to act moderately, but in the
contrary, awarding forfeiture to the state was arbitrary, and violates the Constitution of Utah
Article I, section 9; United States Constitution Amendment VIII [Excessive Fines
Imposement]. The appellant asserts that once a particular controversy has been finally decided in
a legal proceeding it's unconstitutional to be reopened and if so, would fall under an issue of Law
defined as Breach of Contact. Thereafter the appellant has entered a conditional plea agreement for
all charges filed against him, and all charges were known to the prosecution at the time of such pleas.
Thereafter, the appellant being convicted resulting from the State pursuant to, Utah Code Ann. 5837-8 unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) a felony of the third degree, the
"Honorable: R. A. Livingston." pronounced his adjudicative decision, confining the appellant to
imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate period of 0 to 5 years. Thereafter, the
adjudicative decision, the appellant asserted for the records of the trials court and to act upon
as a condition of the plea bargain "sir, since the appellant has.... can the appellant get his
substances back that's being held by the Murray Police Department. Judge Livingston;
ff

jokingly1f Mr. Parker I see no need for the prosecution to hold your substance any longer, but

I am sure that you know that you cannot get the controlled substance back." The Appellant
argument is that, at this time if the prosecution had a rebuttal against the appellant retrieving his
property back or, if the prosecution intentions were to forego civil charges against the appellant
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pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13(1) "Forfeiture" it should have been alighted at that time. The
prosecution failed to enjoin the forsaid issue at the appropriate time. I n reference the appellant
turned the court attention to ; Utah Code Ann, 76-402,2(2).
If another suit derives attempting to litigate the same allegation and facts would be met by
the plea of "res adjudicata,". The appellant further states, that forfeiture of the Appellant vehicle
would fall under [excessive fines]. "The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the excessive fine
clause does apply to civil in rem forfeiture. Austin—U.S.—at—,113, S.Ct. at 2812. As an essential
predicate to this holding the court concluded that the eighth amendment prohibits including the
prohibition against excessive fines, apply in both criminal and civil contexts Id.—at—. 113 S. Ct.
at 2804-06 according to the court, the question is not whether the forfeiture is civil or criminal, but
whether the forfeiture constitutes punishment, Id.—at—113 S.Ct. at 2806." The prosecution asserted
that Appellant "vehicle," even though it's clear of all liens, forfeiture does not constitute punishment,
because the Appellant vehicle does not exceed the costs of prosecution. The appellant asserts that
forfeiture of his vehicle would constitute punishment, when considering the appellant poverty
deficiencies, (see Appendix Titled Source of income), and turns the court's attention to; Cf. Austin.
113 S.Ct. at 2812 N.14;

"Forfeiture of a valuable automobile would constitute punishment in many
situations where the vehicle value greatly exceeded the costs of the
prosecution. But the poor person's loss of his only "wheels" may actually
work much more of a hardship than the wealthy person's loss of a
luxury automobile. Surely the availability of important constitutional
protections cannot turn on such vagaries of economics."

Id. (T)he value of the conveyances...forfeiture... can vary so dramatically that any relationship
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between the government's actual costs and the amount of the sanction is merely coincidental."
Thereafter the appellant asserts after having been sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the
indeterminate period of, 0 to 5 years. The appellant opposed the forfeiture because it would be
unduly harsh and violate the eighth amendment.
"Stare Decisis-"(to stand decided)" once a court has established a principle
applicable to a certain set facts, the same rule will be applied in the
future to all cases involving substantially the same set of facts; see, State vs.
392 South 600 East.. 886 P.2d 534.

of law

Under this test and based on the argument here in, the appellant submits that the decision made by
the trial court should be reversed and all property returned to the appellant.
POINT II
"Did the trial court violate the Appellant fifth amendment Double Jeopardy Rights?".
in concluding that the criminal action and the forfeiture action were separate proceedings, separate
times, separate judges, but litigated the exact same facts. In the States', "MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE." The prosecution states that the appellant failed to
preserve the issue he now raises on appeal, but in the contrary the appellant has submitted to the
Utah Court of Appeal in form of official documents, transcripts of the court hearing dated back on
September 13, 1995 with the honorable judge Sandra Peuler presiding. Attorney Clark Harms
present on behalf of the State, turning the court's face on the appellant insertion of double
jeopardy. It's a fact as the definition of contemporaneous objection, when considering that the
defendant raise the double jeopardy issue by merely stating in the trial court, "Judge Peuler to
proceed with this forfeiture proceeding today would violate my constitution rights ,when
considering that I have already been convicted on the exact same facts that brings clause of
8

REM forfeiture in this court today, and to proceed in such would cause double jeopardy, being
that the case has been closed ,and therefore bars any sequential charges",. Such statement
would meet the scope of preservation to claim that the trial court manifested error, and that such
errors are grounds for review by the court of appeal and, further states that to bring forth a second
prosecution "in pursuant to" Utah Code Ann, 58-37-13(1) would violate ones "Constitutional Fifth
Amendment." The seventh and ninth Circuits have concluded that civil forfeiture proceedings are
separate from criminal proceedings. See, United States vs. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463,1465 (7th Cir.),
Cert, denied. --U.S. - , 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); United States vs S405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33
F. 3d 1210,1216 (9th Cir. 1994). In $405.089.23 U.S. Currency, the government was seeking not
only criminal penalties against the appellant, but was also pursuing civil forfeiture remedies. The
different actions were instituted at roughly the same time, but the forfeiture proceedings were before
a different judge and were not concluded until over a year after the criminal convictions.
Additionally, the forfeiture complaint was based on exactly the same offenses giving rise to
the criminal prosecution, ff[T]he only difference government." 33 F.3d at 1216. This issue before
the court was parallel to the issue before this court, whether the second proceeding was a violation
of the, "appellants' fifth amendment Double Jeopardy rights." In concluding that the criminal action
and the forfeiture action were separate proceeding for double jeopardy purposes, the court stated:
"We fail to see how two separate actions, one civil and one criminal, instituted at
different times, tried at different times, before different district judges, constitute the same
"Proceeding." In ordinary legal parlance, such action are often proceedings
only ifthey were
brought in the same indictment and tired at the same time, characterized as "paralleled Proceeding,"
but not as the same "proceeding."
A forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the same

Id. Moreover, although both proceedings resulted from the same violation of the law, the court
9

stated "We are not willing to white wash the double jeopardy violation in the case by affording
Constitutional significance to the label of "single, coordinated Prosecution.1" Id. at 1217. See also
Toreros, 28 F.3d at 1465 ("Two trials, even if close in time, is still double jeopardy, "); United
States vs. Stanwood, 872 F. Supo 791 (D. or 1994); United States vs McCaslin. 863 F. Supp,
1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994). United States vs Ursery. 59 F.3d 568,575 (6th Cir. 1996) Utah Code
Ann. 58-37-13(9)(h)(1994). See also Utah Code Ann. 76-3-501 (6((h)(1994); 21 U.S.C.A. 881
(West Supp. 1995). Conclusion of forsaid issue before the Utah Court Appeals see; State vs
Wallace Davis.f f (For official Publication)" Case No. 940574-CA (September 1,1995). stop The
only coinciding factor between, State vs. Wallace Davis, and the Appellant case are that the
proceedings were reversed prosecutions order. The Utah State Court of Appeals "Conclusion";

"We hold that the concluded forfeiture action and the pending criminal
proceeding are separate proceedings for Double Jeopardy purpose and that
a forfeiture pursuant to section 58-37-13 constitutes punishment. By
pursuing the criminal proceedings against defendant, the state is attempting
topunish
the defendant a second time for an offense for which he has already
been punished, the very
abuse that the Double Jeopardy clause protects against.
Therefore, we conclude that the
subsequent criminal proceeding is barred by the
Double Jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
Accordingly, the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to dismiss is reversed."

It is clearly obvious that the purpose of the United State Constitution V Amendment, United
States Constitution VIII Amendment, and the Utah Constitutional Amendment Article I, Section
9, were constituted to protect the defendant from such constructive litigation by the prosecution of
authorities, such as the ones here in this Brief of appeal and is the subject of the forsaid appeal for
decision and review.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
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The appellant turns to the [MULTIPLE PROSECUTION AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY]:
Utah Code Ann. G.P. Part 4, 76-1 -401; "Single criminal episode ". defined - Joined of offenses
and Defendants: In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "Single Criminal
Episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. [NJothing in this part shall be construed to limit or
modify the effect of section; (77-21-31), in controlling the joiner of offenses and defendants in
criminal proceedings. (1975) 76-1-402V Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode include offenses (1). A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal episode; however, when
the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under
[Ojnly one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under and such provision bars
a prosecution under any other such provision. (2). Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant [sjhall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the Jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecution attorney at the time the defendant
is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3). A defendant maybe convicted of an offense included in the offenses charges [b]ut may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when;
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form or preparation to
commit the offense charges or an offense otherwise included therein; or
11

© It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4). The Court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with request to an included offense unless
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense.
(5). If the District court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appeal court on appeal or
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the
tries of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict
or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the
included offense; without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 76-1403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1). If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out to the same criminal
episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been
tried under subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution: and
(b) The former prosecution;
(I) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction: or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required
a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure
conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the tried of fact in
a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of lesser

12

include offense is an acquittal of a greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser included
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3). There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of that has not been reverses, set
aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set aside or vacated and that is
capable of supporting a judgment; or plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4). There is an improper termination of prosecution of the termination takes place after a jury has
been impaneled and sworn to try the defendant, or if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness
is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consent to the determination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
© The Court finds and state for the record that the termination is necessary
because :
(I) It is Physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with the law; or
(II) There is legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state
that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible
as a matter of law; or
(III) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to
the state makes the trial without injustice to the defendant or the
state; or
(IV) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(V) False statements of a juror on void dire prevent a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, based on the above argument, I, Frank Parker, acting through Pro Se Counsel
express this appeal from the "Trial Court's" decision, based on a reasoned and studied professional
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judgment that this appeal involves one or more questions of exceptional importance; (1). Did the
"Trial Court" violate the excessive fines clause? and, (2). Did the "Trial Court" violate the
double jeopardy clause? The appellant has submitted evidence that the double jeopardy issue was
preserve in the trial court, and that this case itself is a sound case for review by the court of appeals
and clearly reveals rational facts even with the limited research of the law. This is a case that is
identical to the case; State vs. Wallace Davis for official publication; case NO#. 940574-CA in
which the court of appeals reversed the lower court decision base upon the defendants' constitutional
rights that protect one from double jeopardy, however, the order in which they were prosecuted is
reverse order, but irrelevant to their identity and facts. It is acknowledging that all properties belong
to the appellant, that were found in the proximity of the illegal activity could have been the subject
of forfeiture if the prosecution attorney would have brought fore charges at the appropriate time
which was at the time the appellant was being heard on the criminal episode, failure bars any
sequential charges by law. Therefore the appellant asks the court of appeals to review the significant
of the elements within this document of briefing present by the appellant under the following
considerations that; the appellant is action through Pro Se counseling and studies of the law, the
appellants feels that if such injustice prevails it would be arbitrary and would discredit the justice
pertaining to quoted laws and statues within this briefing as well as violate ones constitutional rights,
and would inflict unduly hardship upon the appellant. This is the sole and profound reason why the
Utah Supreme Court has amended the scope of forfeiture, to protect one from such double jeopardy
and have by law barred proceeding, that's pursued on this manner.
It appears that the prosecution is attempting to inflame this issue by merely bringing up the
appellants past criminal history, "(stating in one of their documents they have forwarded to the
14

courts and I)", that the appellant was under the supervision of parole doing the time he committed
these violations. The appellant asks the court to over look such statements pertaining to the
appellants past criminal history and to recognize that the state is attempting to inflict the appellant
with double jeopardy by merely mentioning facts and evidence of crimes in which the appellant has
already been adjudicated of. The appellant hereby prays that the court of appeals will reverse the
"Forfeiture" of defendants' property ordered by the "Trial Court" on September 13,1995 before the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding. "(Property
described in Appendix)"
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / &

day of October, 1995.

FRANK PARKER / Appellant
PRO SE COUNSEL
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Frank Parker/Pro Se Counsel
1388 Richard Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

Certificate of service
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, this iffi Of M ay, 1996, a true copy
of the foregoing document.
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E. NEAL GUNARSON
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Attorney for the Defendant
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FRANK PARKER
UTAH STATE PRISON
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIALDISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FRANK PARKER
APPELLANT
VS.
94-13659 MURRAY POLICE
DPARTMENT
APPELLEE

(1).

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

NOTICE OF APPEAL #1
CASE NO 950902803CV
JUDGE. SANDRA PEULER

NOTICE IS HERE BY GIVEN THAT APPELLANT, FRANK PARKER.

THROUGH PRO SE COUNSEL, APPEALS, "THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF THE , HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER.
ENTERED IN THIS MATTER BASED UPON ENTIRE JUDGMENT
DATED THIS '^A

day of October, 1995.

FRANK PARKER/ APPELLANT
PROSE
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME THIS ? - ^ ~
OCTOBER, 1995.
.

ADDENDUM F

DAY OF

SflND-Y CIRCUIT COURT.

ID:561-3857

JAN 12'95

14:04 N6.003 P.02

IN THE<THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SANDY DEPARTMENT

iol
Mb

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF JUDGMENT,
SENTENCE A M ) COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
CASE NO; 951000026 FS
JUDGE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
CLERK C. Hatch
_DATE: 1-12-95

vs.
FRANK PARKER,
Defendant.

The defendant being present and represented by Elizabeth A. Bowman and the State
present and represented through Nick D'Alesandro, there being no legal reason why sentence
should not be imposed, the defendant having been convicted by a plea of guilty to Count I as
amended, UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, (cocaine) a felony
of the third degree,
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
IT IS ADJUDGED that (he defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison
for an indeterminate period of 0 lo 5 years as provided by law for the crime of Unlawful
Possession of Controlled Substance, concurrent with time now serving. Court recommends credit
for time served from November 21, 1994.
DATED this 12th day of January, 1995.

ADDENDUM G

•i,

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by:
Assigned to:

R. HAMP
MAJOR DRUG

Plaintiff,
BAIL:

NO BAIL
I N F O R M A T I O N

-vsFRANK PARKER,
DOB 11/12/57
OTN 7382773

Case No.

Defendant,

The undersigned Det, Scott Hansen - Murray City Police
Department, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant, committed the crime of:
COUNT I
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE W-ITM INTENTTO
©TSTRiBy^HE, a S^ccrnd^ Degree Felony, at 4811 SoutA State Street,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 21,
1994 through November 22, 1994, in violation of Title 58,
Chapter 37, Section 8(1) (a) (iv), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended, in that the defendant, FRANK PARKER, a party to
the offense, did knowingly and intentionally have in his
possession a controlled substance, to-wit: MeLliaiuphcLmuina, ^-^ ^
a
Schedule
II Controlled
Substance, with
intent to
distribute.
NO BAIL REQUEST:
The defendant FRANK PARKER is currently on
Probation for another felony. Therefore, pursuant to Article I,
Section 8, Utah Constitution, it is requested that the defendant
be held without bail on the above charge.

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. FRANK PARKER
County Attorney No* 94 012138
Page 2

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINEDv^ERQM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Brandon Price, John Blanchard, Kimberlee Croft, Mike
Faircloth, Terry Steed, Scott Hansen and State Criminalist.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
On November 21, 1994 through November 22, 1994, at
approximately 11:30 p.m. at 4811 South State Street, in Salt Lake
County, defendant was found to be in possession of 11-12 grams of
suspected Methamphetamine which was in twenty separate baggies.
The substance has been field tested and found to be
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance.

DET. SCOTT HANSEN
Affiant '
Subscribed and sworn to before
me this
^ 7 _^&&Y of NoveiE^ST,
1994.
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Authorized for presentment anS filing:v
DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorne^. ,

Deputy County Attorney
November 29, 1994
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